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Citizenship, Voting, and Asian American
Political Engagement
Ana Henderson*
A significant issue for Asian American’s civic engagement and
political empowerment is access to the ballot and to electoral schemes that
allow Asian Pacific Islander American (API) voters to elect
representatives of their choice. Because voting in nearly all U.S.
jurisdictions is limited to citizens, questions about Asian American voters’
citizenship—both real and imagined—can impact electoral access in ways
that decrease electoral strength and participation. This Symposium Article
will focus on two contemporary areas where citizenship issues may affect
API voter access and electoral success: (1) new state laws requiring
verification of citizenship for registration and voting and (2) data
requirements for Voting Rights Act (VRA) compliance in electoral
districts. In the citizenship verification context, API voters may face
additional challenges to registering to vote and casting a ballot, both
because of disparate rates of citizenship compared to other groups as well
as election worker and poll watchers’ suspicions about voters’ citizenship
and therefore eligibility to cast a ballot. In the VRA context, case law
requiring that voters of color seeking to dismantle at-large election systems
that dilute their voting strength use citizenship data to state a prima facie
claim of discrimination may make it impossible for API voters in many
areas to pursue VRA remedies to discriminatory electoral systems.
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INTRODUCTION: THE INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN VOTING AND CITIZENSHIP
Voting in the United States is an important right, not just because, as the
U.S. Supreme Court has recognized, it is “preservative of all rights,”1 but also
because access to the vote is a key expression of citizenship and a symbol of
national membership. National membership validates that an individual is entitled
to the full benefit of legal rights and protections as well as public goods and
services. Access to the ballot box has been contentious since the country’s
founding, leaving various portions of the populace without political voice—and
outside the circle of authentic citizens—throughout U.S. history and even today.
At the country’s founding, despite appeals to equality in our founding
documents, whole populations were excluded from the franchise due to their race,
ethnicity, gender, or economic status. Voting was limited to white, land-owning
males,2 and representation in the U.S. House of Representatives was apportioned
with racial stratification (excluding all Indians not taxed and counting the slave
(black) population as only three-fifths of its actual size).3 In the antebellum period,
when voting was generally open to free males, free black men were often denied
their right to vote, even in the North.4 Voting rights were denied to American
Indians who paid taxes and had abandoned their tribal affiliation,5 but granted to
Mexican Americans, at least formally, who through treaty were declared to be
white.6
Even after the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibited denying
the right to vote on the basis of race or color, voting rights were regularly denied
to citizens of color.7 States adopted laws that limited access to the franchise
1. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370
(1886).
2. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2009).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
4. See, e.g., Hobbs v. Fogg, 6 Watts 553, 560 (Pa. 1837); see also A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR.,
SHADES OF FREEDOM 170–72 (1996).
5. See, e.g., Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884).
6. See People v. de la Guerra, 40 Cal. 311, 338–39 (1866).
7. Immediately after the Civil War and passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, black
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through a variety of means including voter registration requirements, literacy tests,
poll taxes, English-only elections, and more, which were often applied in a
discriminatory manner. API voters were affected by state and national policies.
Some states overtly excluded certain groups. For example, California’s 1879
Constitution prohibited “natives of China” from voting, despite the Fifteenth
Amendment’s passage just nine years earlier.8 Many Asian Americans who were
immigrants were disenfranchised by citizenship requirements for voting, which
states started adopting in the late nineteenth century.9 Since naturalization was
limited to whites and those of African descent at the time,10 immigrants from
Asian countries were largely prohibited from becoming naturalized citizens.11
Accordingly, being “alien[s] ineligible to citizenship,”12 Asian immigrants could
not participate in elections when the right to vote was restricted to citizens.
This disenfranchisement continued until the civil rights movement of the
mid-twentieth century. New laws and aggressive enforcement cajoled several
states into removing bars to the franchise. Revisions to immigration and
registration, participation, and representation skyrocketed to levels not seen since through a
combination of federal protection and intensive black mobilization. However, state governments
soon began to restrict black voting rights by instituting a variety of new eligibility and registration
requirements, which were often waived for whites. Coupled with violent retribution against blacks
who sought to exercise their voting rights and withdrawal of federal protections, these state laws had
a devastating effect: within thirty years, blacks in the South were forced out of the political system. See
RICHARD M. VALELLY, THE TWO RECONSTRUCTIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK ENFRANCHISEMENT 128 (2004). Latinos were similarly disenfranchised by eligibility requirements, such as English
language abilities, as well as extralegal efforts to disenfranchise them. See MORGAN KOUSSER,
COLORBLIND JUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 69–70 (1999). Native Americans were regularly disenfranchised, even into the 1950s, by
state constitutions that refused to grant them the vote. See, e.g., WE THE PEOPLE, http://research
.history.org/pf/weThePeople (last visited Jan. 13, 2013) (noting that New Mexico was last to grant
suffrage to Native Americans in state elections in 1962).
8. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1879). This section also designated that only male citizens could
vote and further stated that “no native of China, no idiot, insane person, or person convicted of any
infamous crime, and no person hereafter convicted of the embezzlement or misappropriation of
public money” possessed the right of suffrage. Id.
9. See KEYSSAR, supra note 2, at 315–19 tbl.A.4.
10. See MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF
AMERICA 38 (2004).
11. See IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 31
(2006).
12. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship, “Foreignness,” and Racial
Hierarchy in American Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 261, 271 n.36 (1997) (noting that the origins of the term
“alien ineligible to citizenship” came from several state and federal laws in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries that made distinctions on an individual immigrant’s ability to naturalize or
lack thereof); see, e.g., The California Alien Land Law of 1913, 1913 Cal. Stat. 40–41. At the time,
naturalization was restricted to whites and individuals of African descent. Through a series of cases
regarding naturalization, which Ian Haney López has called “the prerequisite cases,” the courts
deemed Asian immigrants as ineligible to naturalize since they were not white (and not of African
descent); see HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 11 passim. By drafting laws prohibiting land ownership, for
example, by aliens ineligible to citizenship, states were able to legislate against Asian immigrants
without overtly naming race or national origin. See NGAI, supra note 10, at 39–40.
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naturalization laws opened Asian immigration to the United States as well as
removed bars to Asian immigrant naturalization.13 The Voting Rights Act of 1965
and substantial federal attention and enforcement helped open the political system
to black citizens again. The 1975 amendments to the VRA extended its
protections to certain language minorities—Asian, Native American/Alaska
Native, and Spanish heritage.14 In the process, it banned discrimination and
required certain jurisdictions to provide election related information in languages
other than English, opening up the electoral process for meaningful participation
by limited English proficient Asian American, Native American, and Latino
citizens.15
While the VRA and other federal provisions, coupled with vigorous
enforcement by federal officials as well as private parties, expanded formal
membership in the electorate to more groups than ever, they did not throw the
circle of membership open to all. Today, laws remain on the books in several
states that exclude various classes of individuals: citizens who have been convicted
of a felony,16 citizens who are not registered to vote,17 and/or citizens who have
been deemed mentally incompetent, among others. Moreover, in nearly all
jurisdictions, access to the ballot is limited to U.S. citizens, although in the past
non-citizens were allowed to vote in many elections.18

13. Immigration of Asian nationals had been severely restricted, and in some cases barred, for
many years. The change in immigration policies removed these race-based restrictions. For a
discussion of exclusion of Asians from immigration and naturalization, see generally NGAI, supra note
10.
14. The 1975 amendments also included non-English language assistance requirements,
allowing the meaningful participation of limited English proficient citizens. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a
(2006).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973. In addition, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, in
turn, banned poll taxes, eradicating another mode of disenfranchisement. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
16. These “felon disenfranchisement” laws vary from state to state. In the most extreme,
individuals convicted of a felony lose their right to vote for life; in other states, civil rights may be
restored. See Map of Felony Disenfranchisement Laws Around the Country, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE,
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/map_felony_disenfranchisement_laws_around_co
untry (last visited Jan. 13, 2013); see also THE SENTENCING PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject
.org/template/page.cfm?id=133 (last visited Jan. 13, 2013).
17. Nearly all states limit voting to registered voters, and most states require voters to register
up to thirty days before an election in order to cast a ballot. See National Mail Voter Registration Form,
U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N (Mar. 1, 2006), http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Page/National
%20Mail%20Voter%20Registration%20Form%20-%20English.pdf. The waiting period between
registration and voting used to be significantly longer, barring many new arrivals from participation,
ostensibly because individuals needed more time living in a jurisdiction before they could make
intelligent decisions about its government. The thirty-day maximum waiting period was established in
the NVRA. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1(d).
18. This was not always the case. Earlier in U.S. history, non-citizen residents were permitted
to vote in many states and territories. See KEYSSAR, supra note 2, at 315–19 tbl.A.4; Jamin B. Raskin,
Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U.
PA. L. REV. 1391, 1397 (1993) (citing Leon E. Aylsworth, The Passing of Alien Suffrage, 25 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 114, 114 (1931)).
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I. MODERN DAY PREOCCUPATION WITH CITIZENSHIP IN VOTING
The issue of citizenship and voting has become increasingly contentious in
recent years, with laws, policies, legal opinions, and public debate focusing on
whether and how non-citizens can or should be involved with U.S. elections. In
the registration context, we see a push to verify that citizens—and only citizens—
register to vote in the form of new requirements and questioning of citizenship
status, even of already registered voters. In the Voting Rights Act districting
context, we see data requirements that attempt to limit any potential influence or
“counting” of non-citizens in districting decisions. Both of these issues may affect
API participation and representation.
A. Citizenship Verification in Voter Registration
As noted above, U.S. citizenship is a requirement for voting in nearly all
jurisdictions and elections in the United States. During much of the late twentieth
century, citizens “proved” their citizenship eligibility19 by affirming or swearing to
it, under penalty of perjury. In 1993, the National Voter Registration Act
(NVRA),20 streamlined the registration process for federal elections to increase
voter access and participation, requiring the creation of voter registration forms
that could be submitted by mail and directing the states to provide opportunities
to register to vote when individuals obtained driver’s licenses or other social
services provided by the state.21 The federally mandated forms provide a space for
registrants to swear they are citizens, eighteen or over, and otherwise eligible to
vote.22
In 2004, this began to change. Instead of accepting a sworn statement as to
citizenship, states started requiring more—verification of citizenship status. In a
growing number of states and among some pundits, an individual’s word and the
penalty of perjury were no longer sufficient to ensure that aliens did not gain
access to the ballot. Voter rolls and authentic citizens had to be protected from
non-citizen infiltration.23 As of December 2013, five states had passed laws,24 and

19. Other criteria such as age and residency were also “proven” through attestation.
20. While the NVRA places a variety of restrictions and requirements on states’ voter
registration practices, it is most well known for the “motor voter” provisions. Indeed, it is often
referred to as the “motor voter law,” thanks to a provision requiring states to offer individuals the
ability to register to vote when applying for a driver’s license. The NVRA also requires states to
provide the opportunity to register to vote at social services offices, mandates the acceptance of a
federal registration form, and places certain requirements on states regarding the maintenance of their
voter registration rolls. This includes requirements that they maintain accurate rolls and prohibits the
purging of voters within ninety days of an election. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg.
21. Id.
22. Id. § 1973gg-3(c)(2)(C).
23. See infra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
24. States that had adopted citizenship verification requirements for voter registration
included Arizona, Georgia, Kansas, Alabama and West Virginia. See Ana Henderson, Web Special:
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several other states had recently considered legislation, requiring some kind of
citizenship verification in order to register to vote.25 These citizenship verification
laws fall into two general categories: (1) verification through documentary proof
of citizenship and (2) verification by database cross-reference. In addition, in the
run up to the 2012 elections, some states instituted administrative actions to verify
voter citizenship. State administrative action included cross-referencing voter rolls
and other databases to determine citizenship status with the ultimate goal of
purging them from voter rolls.
1. State Laws Requiring Documentary Proof of Citizenship in Order to Register
Three states have passed, and several others have considered, laws requiring
applicants to present documentary proof of citizenship in order to register to vote.
These laws signal a departure from the prior practice of accepting a sworn
statement of citizenship as sufficient proof of citizenship to register to vote. Each
of the laws adopted thus far apply only to new registrants, so voters who are
currently registered do not need to prove their citizenship.
The first citizenship verification law was Arizona’s Proposition 200 in 2004.
Proposition 200, known as the “Protect Arizona Now” initiative, was a ballot
initiative approved by Arizona voters that addressed a variety of citizenship based
issues. Among other things, Proposition 200 required documentary proof of
citizenship in order to register to vote.26 Proposition 200 revised Arizona election
Citizenship Verification, Obstacle to Voter Registration and Participation, URBAN HABITAT, http://urban
habitat.org/19-1/henderson (last visited Nov. 1, 2013).
25. Citizenship verification for voter registration was a particularly hot issue in the states
during 2012, with at least seven states considering legislation that would add additional citizenship
requirements to the right to register to vote. Seventeen states introduced such legislation in 2012:
Alabama, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New
Hampshire, Nevada, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Washington. See
Election 2012: Voting Laws Roundup, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www
.brennancenter.org/analysis/election-2012-voting-laws-roundup#_edn2. In August 2012, seven states
were actively considering numerous pieces of legislation on this issue: California, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, South Carolina, Missouri, Michigan, and Virginia. H.B. 2109, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Mo. 2011), available at http://www.house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills121/sumpdf/HB2109I.pdf;
H.B. 515, 162nd Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2011), available at http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/
legislation/2012/HB0515.html; Assemb. B. 2497, 2011–2012 State Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012),
available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_2451-2500/ab_2479_bill_20120224
_introduced.pdf; H.B. 569, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012), available at http://lis.virginia
.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?121+ful+HB569H1+pdf; H.B. 194, 187th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass.
2011), available at https://malegislature.gov/Bills/187/House/H194); S.B. 304, 119th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(S.C. 2011), available at http://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess119_2011-2012/bills/304.htm; H.B. 828,
2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012), available at http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?121
+ful+HB828+pdf; H.B. 895, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012), available at http://lis.virginia
.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?121+ful+HB895+pdf; H.B. 5221, 2011–12 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mi. 2011),
available at http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2011-2012/billintroduced/House/pdf/2011
-HIB-5221.pdf. In Virginia, three bills were pending. H.B. 569, supra; H.B. 828, supra; H.B. 895, supra.
26. It also required identification in order to cast a ballot, proof of eligibility for non-federal
public benefits, and that local officials report suspected undocumented immigrants to federal officials.
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law to require that county registrars reject any application for registration that did
not contain or come accompanied with acceptable proof of citizenship. Accepted
documents include an Arizona driver’s license issued after 1996, a passport, a birth
certificate, or naturalization papers.27 While a citizen could register by mail and
provide a copy of a passport or birth certificate, naturalized citizens using their
naturalization papers were required to present original documents in person for
inspection at their county registrar’s office, and an individual supplying only a
naturalization number would not be registered until the number is verified with
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).28
In 2011, the Kansas legislature passed the Kansas Secure and Fair Elections
Act, which required photo identification at the polls starting January 1, 2012 and
proof of citizenship to register to vote starting January 1, 2013.29 The Kansas law
designates the following as proof of citizenship: a U.S. passport, a birth certificate
showing U.S. citizenship, a driver’s license from a state that requires citizenship
for licensing, a Bureau of Indian Affairs identification card or number, and
naturalization papers or numbers (but numbers must be verified with ICE before
an applicant is added to the rolls).30
In 2011, Alabama passed HB 56, the “Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen
Protection Act.” HB 56 was arguably the strictest state immigration law in the
nation and has garnered international attention and several lawsuits. However, the
law’s voter registration provisions (section 29) garnered relatively little attention.
Section 29 of the Act requires proof of citizenship prior to being added to the
voter rolls. The law accepts the same documentation as Kansas.31

See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §16-166(F) (2010), preempted by Gonzalez v. Ariz., 677 F.3d 383 (9th Cir.
2012) (holding that Arizona’s citizenship requirement was a violation of the NVRA since it places
additional requirements on voters’ ability to register to vote beyond what the NVRA mandates).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. In January 2012, Kansas’s secretary of state asked the legislature to move the
implementation date of citizenship verification procedures up to June 1, 2012, so that it would be in
effect for what Kansas secretary of state has called, “the spike in registrations” associated with the
2012 presidential election. See John Hanna, Kansas Voter ID Laws: Kris Kobach, Kansas Secretary of State,
Seeks Citizenship Proof, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 10, 2012 9:07 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/2012/01/10/kansas-voter-id-laws-kris-kobach_n_1198172.html. Legislation to effectuate this
request ultimately died in committee. See John Celock, Kris Kobach, Kansas Secretary of State, Defends Voter
ID Law, HUFFINGTON POST (June 2, 2012 2:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/
02/kris-kobach-kansas-voter-id-law_n_1564740.html.
30. Proof of U.S. Citizenship for Voter Registration, GOT VOTER ID?, http://www.gotvoterid
.com/proof-of-citizenship.html#evidence (last visited Jan. 13, 2013).
31. In Kansas and Alabama, the names and sex on the birth certificate much match that on
the voter registration form. For some populations, such as married women, for example, there is
likely to be an inconsistency between their birth certificate name and voter registration name,
requiring them to take the additional step of completing a form explaining the reason for the
inconsistency under penalty of perjury. Interestingly, while these laws allow a voter to attest to their
identity, they disallow the attestation of citizenship. See ALA. CODE § 31-13-27(a)(5) (2011), declared
unconstitutional by United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012) (challenging portions of
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2. State Laws Requiring Citizenship Verification by Cross-Reference
Two states have addressed citizenship verification through legislation
requiring cross-referencing with a citizenship database. Rather than require the
voter to provide additional documentation or proof with his registration, these
states cross-reference applicant information with other state databases to try to
determine citizenship status. If questions about citizenship arise, the voter is
provided an opportunity to prove her citizenship status. A voter who does not
produce sufficient proof will not be permitted to register or remain registered to
vote.
In 2008, the Georgia legislature passed legislation requiring verification of
registrants’ citizenship before they may be added to the voter rolls. Under the
Georgia regime, registrants are cross-referenced with the state’s driver’s license
database to determine citizenship. If an individual appears as a non-citizen in
drivers’ records, her citizenship must be verified, either through documentation or
communication with ICE, before her registration may be processed and she may
be registered as a voter. Like the Arizona, Alabama, and Kansas laws, Georgia’s
law only applies to new registrants.
In 2011, Tennessee legislators passed a statute requiring that the state’s voter
rolls be cross-referenced with other state and federal databases to identify
potential non-citizens who are registered to vote.32 When cross-referencing raises
a question about a voter’s citizenship status, county officials must send the voter a
notice requiring him to produce proof of citizenship within thirty days or be
removed from the voter rolls. Acceptable proof of citizenship includes a birth
certificate, passport, naturalization papers, or other documentation accepted by
the Immigration Control and Reform Act of 1986. Unlike Arizona, Kansas, and
Georgia, Tennessee will apparently not limit citizenship verification to new
registrations, but rather will check the citizenship of all registered voters.
3. State Administrative Action on Citizenship Verification
In addition to these statutes and constitutional provisions, in 2011 and into
the summer of 2012, several states instituted administrative processes to attempt
to identify and purge non-citizens who were registered to vote. Similar to the
Tennessee law, officials in these states cross-referenced voter information with
other state databases that might indicate citizenship status.33 In addition, some
states requested access to the federal Systematic Alien Verification and

the Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 Ala. Laws 535); K.S.A.
§ 25-2309 (2012).
32. S.B. 352, 107th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011).
33. In addition, in 2012 Michigan adopted administrative policies requiring voters to verify
their citizenship at the polling place in order to receive a ballot. A federal court issued a preliminary
injunction of the application of this requirement prior to the November 2012 Presidential Elections.
See Bryanton v. Johnson, 902 F. Supp. 2d 983, 986 (E. D. Mich. 2012).
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Entitlement (SAVE) database.34 The SAVE program, administered by the
Department of Homeland Security, is a web-based “service that helps federal,
state and local benefit-issuing agencies, institutions, and licensing agencies
determine the immigration status of benefit applicants so only those entitled to
benefits receive them.”35 States sought access to the SAVE database to check the
citizenship status of registered voters.
Registered voters identified as suspected non-citizens were to be informed of
discrepancies and required to verify their citizenship or be removed from the
voter rolls. Failure to prove citizenship could result in a voter being purged from
voter rolls or subject to challenge in the polling place. Because these
administrative processes were not public, complete information about them is not
readily available for analysis. Press accounts and limited public statements from
officials provide the bulk of information about these administrative processes.
In Florida, the secretary of state instituted an administrative initiative to
purge voter rolls of non-citizens. In spring 2011, Florida officials claimed that
cross-referencing driver’s license and voter roll information revealed more than
180,000 non-citizens were registered to vote.36 That initial figure was revised to
approximately 2600 potential registered non-citizens.37 The state instructed county
supervisors to contact identified voters requesting proof of citizenship and to
purge those who did not comply. However, Florida’s actions made news when
many county registrars refused to follow the state’s orders to question or purge

34. According to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services:
In 1986, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA),
which required the creation and implementation of a verification system that confirms
immigration statuses of individuals applying for certain federally-funded benefits. This
system originally came under the jurisdictional purview of legacy Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS). To successfully accommodate this federal mandate, legacy
INS created the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) Program in 1987
to develop the verification system. With the creation of the Department of Homeland
Security in 2003, jurisdiction is now under the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS), Verification Division.
About the SAVE Program, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/
portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=40fabff1bc0ca110Vgn
VCM1000004718190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=2af29c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD
(last visited Jan. 13, 2013).
35. SAVE, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/portal/
site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=1721c2ec0c7c8110VgnVCM
1000004718190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=1721c2ec0c7c8110VgnVCM1000004718190aRCRD
(last
visited Jan. 13, 2013).
36. Gary Fineout & Brendan Farrington, Fla. Voter-Roll Screening Yields Few Non-Citizens,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 12, 2012, 10:48 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/fla-voter-rollscreening-yields-few-non-citizens.
37. Michael C. Bender, Florida to Continue Hunt for Illegal Voters as Election Nears, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-09-17/florida-to
-continue-hunt-for-illegal-voters-as-election-nears.
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identified voters after more than five hundred voters on it turned out to be
citizens.38
As part of its administrative efforts, Florida requested access to the federal
SAVE database for voter citizenship registration,39 and sued the United States
Department of Homeland Security when access was not provided.40 Florida
argued that federal records would allow it to verify citizenship of voters in
question.41 In June 2012, the federal government granted Florida officials access
to the SAVE database. After Florida cross-referenced the 2625 suspected noncitizen voters with the SAVE database, it reported that its “Voter Eligibility
Initiative” ultimately found 207 non-citizens on state voter rolls.42 The secretary of
state proclaimed in its announcement that “The Voter Eligibility Initiative is
already proving to be a successful process to identify illegally registered voters on
Florida’s voter rolls.”43
In Colorado, the secretary of state compared voter rolls with individuals who
had used documents to obtain driver’s licenses that indicated they were not
citizens, such as a U.S. Permanent Resident Card.44 Colorado officials initially
estimated that 11,805 non-citizens might be registered statewide.45 The state
eventually sent letters to 3903 suspected non-citizens46 notifying them to withdraw
their registration voluntarily or prove their U.S. citizenship.47 Voters who did not

38. See Fineout & Farrington, supra note 36.
39. See Letter from Ken Detzner, Fla. Sec’y of State, to Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec. (May 31, 2012), available at http://www.dos.state.fl.us/news/communications/
pressRelease/pdf/Letter_to_DHS_Secretary_Napolitano_5-31-2012.pdf.
40. See Complaint, Fla. Dep’t of State v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (No. 1:12-cv-00960),
available at http://www.dos.state.fl.us/news/communications/pressRelease/pdf/6-11-2012_DOS
_vs_DHS_re_SAVE_Database.pdf.
41. See Letter from Ken Detzner to Janet Napolitano, supra note 39.
42. Press Release, Fla. Dep’t of State, Florida’s Voter Eligibility Initiative Confirms 207 NonCitizens on Voter Rolls Using SAVE Database, Around 8 Percent of Voters Checked (Sept. 12, 2012)
[hereinafter Voter Eligibility Initiative], available at http://www.dos.state.fl.us/news/communications/
pressRelease/pressRelease.aspx?id=604; see also Bender, supra note 37.
43. See Voter Eligibility Initiative, supra note 42. It is unknown how many voters were
erroneously purged, perhaps for not affirmatively proving their citizenship or for not responding to
requests for confirmation. However, the state settled a lawsuit challenging the citizenship purges, and
agreed to reinstate voters and notify affected voters of their continued eligibility to vote. See Fineout
& Farrington, supra note 36.
44. Ivan Moreno, Colorado Voter Purge: Many Suspected Ineligible Voters Actually U.S. Citizens,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 29, 2012, 10:50 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/29/
colorado-voter-purge-list_n_1841731.html.
45. Ivan Moreno, Republicans Look for Voter Fraud, Find Little, YAHOO! NEWS (Sept. 24, 2012,
1:26 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/republicans-look-voter-fraud-little-172327169--election.html.
46. Some have expressed concern that voters were targeted for partisan purposes. Ivan
Moreno, Gessler Says 141 Illegally Registered to Vote, AURORA SENTINEL (Sept. 10, 2012, 7:37 AM),
http://www.aurorasentinel.com/news/gessler-says-141-illegally-registered-to-vote (“In Colorado, the
majority of the letters questioning citizenship went to Democrats, 1,566, and independents, 1,794.
Gessler’s office said they didn’t look at party affiliation before sending the letters.”).
47. Id.
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respond would be purged from voter rolls and unable to vote. State officials
received 482 responses affirming citizenship, and sixteen voluntary withdrawals of
registration.48
Subsequently, Colorado officials were able to cross-reference 1416 of the
questionable registrants with the federal SAVE database. The SAVE database
confirmed the U.S. citizenship status of all but 141.49 In September 2012, the
secretary of state, citing limited time before the election to conduct eligibility
hearings of these 141 individuals, stated that the only action he would take against
them was to provide their names to county election officials for challenging as
needed.50
In 2011, New Mexico’s51 secretary of state cross-referenced voter rolls with
driver’s license and other records to look for non-citizens registered to vote. As a
result, she referred sixty-four thousand voter files to state police due to
“irregularities.”52 She later reported that 117 “foreign nationals” had been
identified on the voter rolls, and thirty-seven had voted.53 However, it was unclear
whether those suspected of being non-citizens were in fact not citizens since the
secretary of state refused to release information leading to their identification and
because the list of “foreign nationals” upon which she relied apparently also
contained citizens who had used an alternate form of identification to prove their
identity when applying for a driver’s license.54
Iowa’s secretary of state launched a similar effort in 2012.55 He instituted
special emergency rules to implement a plan to check voter rolls for non-citizens,
bypassing the normal rulemaking procedure as well as public comment.56 He
claimed that cross-referencing with state transportation records revealed that 3582
non-citizens were registered to vote.57 Iowa sought access to the SAVE database
to run further investigation of these registered voters, but before gaining such
access, an Iowa judge enjoined the state’s plans to question and purge voters on

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Steve Terrell, Duran Joins Effort Asking Feds to Help Stop Voter Fraud, THE NEW MEXICAN
(July 11, 2012), http://www.santafenewmexican.com/Local%20News/071212VOTERS.
52. Michael Haederle, New Mexico Roiled by Voter Fraud Claims, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 2011, at
A11, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/31/nation/la-na-voter-fraud-20110731.
53. Id.
54. Milan Simonich, ACLU Sues Secretary of State over Voter Registration, ALAMOGORDO DAILY
NEWS (July 20, 2011, 1:11 PM), http://www.alamogordonews.com/ci_18514986.
55. Jason Noble, Schultz Blames Feds for Delay in Removal of Ineligible Voters, THE DES MOINES
REGISTER, Sept. 15, 2012, at 1B.
56. Rod Boshart, Iowa Voting Rule Changes on Hold in Wake of Judge’s Ruling, Schultz Says, THE
GAZETTE (Sept. 18, 2012, 2:00 PM), http://thegazette.com/2012/09/18/iowa-voting-rule-changeson-hold-in-wake-of-judges-ruling-schultz-says.
57. Noble, supra note 55. This is out of 1,881,145 active and 2,114,408 total registered voters
as of August 2012. Monthly Voter Registration Totals: August 2012, IOWA SEC’Y OF STATE 4,
http://sos.iowa.gov/elections/pdf/VRStatsArchive/2012/CoAug12.pdf.
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the basis that the emergency rulemaking had not been necessary.58 Moreover, the
court found that concerns about voter eligibility could be sufficiently addressed by
the voter challenge provisions in effect before the special rulemaking.
Proponents of citizenship verification argue that it is necessary to safeguard
the electoral process from fraudulent non-citizen voting and protect the votes of
legal citizens. They argue that due to lax registration requirements in the NVRA,
particularly the lack of any requirement to prove eligibility, non-citizens can and
are registering to vote and even voting.59 Arguments for requiring proof of
citizenship generally follow some incarnation of the following formula: (1)
registering to vote is very easy, with no safeguards or requirements to prevent
fraudulent registration; (2) there are many non-citizens in the country, including
millions of “illegals”; (3) such non-citizens could register to vote if they lie about
their citizenship and could then cast illegal ballots; and (4) several recent elections
have been decided by small margins, so illegal non-citizen votes could affect
electoral outcomes.60 Although some pundits admit “there is no reliable method
to determine the number of non-citizens registered or actually voting,” they warn
that “[t]housands of non-citizens are registered in some states, and tens if not
hundreds of thousands may be present on the voter rolls nationwide.”61
Given the fervor of advocacy for anti-fraud provisions and intensity of
claims of non-citizen voting, one would expect ample evidence of widespread
non-citizen participation. However, there is very little evidence of non-citizen
voting fraud, that is non-citizens who intentionally register and vote despite
knowing they are not eligible to do so. For example, an analysis of voting crime
records in California between 1994 and 2006 found 161 complaints about noncitizen registration.62 Of the 104 cases where state officials determined there was a
criminal violation, 101 resulted in no action because the defendant lacked intent to
commit fraud, and only two resulted in a criminal conviction or guilty plea.63

58. Boshart, supra note 56.
59. See Hearing on “You Don’t Need Papers to Vote?” Non-Citizen Voting and ID Requirements in U.S.
Elections: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on H. Admin., 109th Cong. 118–23 (2006) (statement of Dan
Stein, President, Fed’n for American Immigration Reform); HANS A. VON SPAKOVSKY, THE
HERITAGE FOUND., THE THREAT OF NON-CITIZEN VOTING 8–9 (2008), available at http://www
.heritage.org/Research/LegalIssues/lm28.cfm.
60. VON SPAKOVSKY, supra note 59, at 1.
61. Id.
62. LORRAINE C. MINNITE, THE MYTH OF VOTER FRAUD 59–61 (2010). Similarly, an
investigation of “illegal voting” in the 2004 gubernatorial election in Washington State found only two
non-citizens, both university students, voted in the election, out of 2.9 million votes cast. See
Stephanie Rice, Illegal Residents Could be Voting: Officials Say Most Noncitizens Wouldn’t Take Such a Risk,
THE COLUMBIAN (Aug. 17, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://www.columbian.com/news/2010/aug/17/
illegal-residents-could-be-voting. The vast majority of the 1678 “illegal votes” were cast by felons. Id.
63. MINNITE, supra note 62, at 59 tbl.4.2.
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During this same period, more than seventy-five million votes were cast in
California.64
The administrative actions in Florida, New Mexico, and Colorado confirm
that the incidence of non-citizen registration and voting is very small. In each
state, initially large estimates of non-citizen voter registration were winnowed
down to a very small fraction of registered voters, meaning the overwhelming
majority of those originally identified were erroneously suspected of being noncitizens. Colorado’s claimed 11,805 non-citizens resulted in only 141 remaining
under suspicion (out of 3,491,088 registered voters),65 New Mexico’s 64,000
irregularities reduced to 117 (out of 1,216,654 registered voters),66 and Florida’s
original claim of over 180,000 registered non-citizens boiled down to just 207 (out
of 11,483,461 registered voters).67 In addition, the ultimate numbers may be even
smaller since some of these individuals turned out to be naturalized citizens whose
records had not been updated.68 While non-citizens should not register to vote or
vote in jurisdictions where they are not eligible, initial large claims of non-citizen
registration as well as the large amount of resources dedicated to investigating
voter rolls suggest to the media, election workers, and the public that non-citizens
pose a threat to election security.
B. Citizenship, Electoral Districts, and the Voting Rights Act
In some Voting Rights Act cases dealing with electoral systems and districts,
citizenship has also become an issue. The VRA prohibits, inter alia, electoral
practices that have the purpose or effect of making the electoral process less open
to some citizens than others based on race, color, or protected language minority
status.69 It has been interpreted as prohibiting electoral schemes, such as at-large
elections or districting plans, that do not provide minority voters with an
opportunity to elect a representative of their choice.70 In these cases, both the
remedy of choice, and the legal standard for making a prima facie case, focus on
the ability to create one or more single-member districts in which the minority
group in question forms a majority.
The citizenship case law has also affected redistricting. A key requirement for
64. Id. at 61.
65. COLO. SEC’Y OF STATE, TOTAL VOTERS REGISTERED BY STATUS: AUGUST 2012, at 1, 2
(2012), available at http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/VoterRegNumbers/2012/August/Voter
CountsByStatus.pdf. This is total registration. A smaller number (2,330,000) were active voters. Id.
66. N.M. SEC’Y OF STATE, NEW MEXICO VOTER REGISTRATION STATISTICS REPORT BY
JURISDICTION: AUGUST 2012, at 1 (2012), available at http://www.sos.state.nm.us/uploads/FileLinks/
2966cef424224c59b1abaf5b30a91116/STATEWIDEAUG312012.PDF.
67. FLA. DIV. OF ELECTIONS, VOTER REGISTRATION MONTHLY REPORT: JULY 2012, at 1, 2
(2012), available at http://election.dos.state.fl.us/voter-registration/archives/2012/July/Monthly.pdf.
68. See Moreno, supra note 45.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006). Section 2 also prohibits purposeful discrimination on the basis of
race, color, or protected language minority status in voting. Id.
70. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 55–61 (1986).
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jurisdictions that use election districts is that districts contain roughly the same
number of people. Since the 1960s, jurisdictions have been required to redraw
districts, usually subsequent to the release of decennial census data, to address
inequalities in population and effectuate the goal of “one person, one vote.” The
idea behind “one person, one vote” was that malapportioned districts—districts
with unequal populations—led to inequities in voter power, with the votes of
individuals in overpopulated districts diluted or carrying less weight compared
with those of voters living in less populated districts. The U.S. Supreme Court
found that such malapportioned districts violated Fourteenth Amendment’s equal
protection guarantees.71
In the context of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act,72 vote dilution refers to
the ability to elect a representative of choice. That is, does the method of electing
make it more difficult or impossible for minority voters to elect a representative of
choice?73 An electoral system can dilute minority voting strength in a variety of
ways. First, at-large election systems can submerge minority voting strength if the
majority votes against minority interests. For example, API voters will have great
difficulty mustering enough votes to elect a representative of choice to a city
council in an at-large election if they constitute only forty percent of the
population and the majority sixty percent always vote against their interests.
Second, districting schemes that divide or “crack” minority populations into
several districts rather than drawing them together into a district where they
constitute the majority limit the ability to elect a representative of choice. For
example, if a city’s API population were concentrated in one area and were large
enough to be a majority in a single district, dividing it between two or more
districts in which Asian Americans do not constitute a majority would “crack” the
API vote.

71. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); see also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1
(1964)(holding that U.S. House of Representatives districts must have roughly equal populations
pursuant to Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution).
72. No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure
shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results
in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section
1973b(f )(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b) . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1973(a). Although some jurists dispute that section 2 applies to electoral districts, see
Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 26 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting), the Supreme Court has
consistently applied it in cases challenging electoral systems and districts. See, e.g., id.; League of United
Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
73. A violation . . . is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown
that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not
equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) [race
or language minority] in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. . . .
[N]othing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in
numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (emphasis added).
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Finally, districting schemes that over concentrate or “pack” a minority
community in a way that reduces the number of districts in which they can elect a
representative of choice. A packing scenario would include a city where Asian
American voters could comprise a majority in two districts, but instead are
“packed” into one district where they constitute a supermajority of the voters and
perhaps others where they are less than the majority. These forms of minority
vote dilution have been recognized to violate the Voting Rights Act, when certain
other conditions exist.74
Geographic and demographic distribution of populations has become a
paramount concern in VRA litigation and redistricting discussions. In addition,
since single-member electoral districts drawn with a majority of minority voters
have proven a powerful tool to minority electoral success and political
participation,75 the manner in which such districts are drawn and redrawn is a key
consideration for minority voter empowerment. As a result, a key question in
litigation to dismantle at-large systems of election or rectify districting systems that
dilute minority voting strength, as well as in constructing redistricting plans to
avoid violating the VRA, is the location and concentration of minority groups
within a jurisdiction.
The preoccupation with population distribution stems from the U.S.
Supreme Court’s 1986 Thornburg v. Gingles76 opinion. The Court laid out a threepart test that voters challenging multimember districts must prove in order to state
a claim: (1) the minority population is sufficiently large and compact to constitute
a majority in a single member district; (2) the minority group is politically cohesive
in that they tend to vote the same in elections; and (3) the majority group tends to
vote as a bloc against the interests of the minority group so that they usually are
able to defeat candidates supported by the minority group.
This three-part test has come to be known as the “Gingles preconditions,”
and is a necessary first step in challenging an electoral scheme with an alleged

74. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 6.
75. Some research also suggests a potential energizing effect on minority voter participation as
well. The presence of a co-ethnic candidate tends to increase participation, e.g., the presence of an
API candidate tends to correlate with increased voting among API voters. Accordingly, the
construction of majority-minority districts where minority candidates are more likely to run for office
can have collateral effects of increasing civic participation among traditionally disenfranchised
communities that tend to vote at lower rates than non-Latino whites. See, e.g., Matt A. Barreto et al.,
The Mobilizing Effect of Majority-Minority Districts in Latino Turnout, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 65, 74 (2004).
The reason that a minority group making such a challenge must show, as a threshold
matter, that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a
single-member district is this: Unless minority voters possess the potential to elect
representatives in the absence of the challenged structure or practice, they cannot claim to
have been injured by that structure or practice.
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 n.17.
76. Gingles dealt with a challenge to the 1982 North Carolina legislative redistricting plan that
alleged that the plan “impaired black citizens’ ability to elect representatives of their choice.” See
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 35.
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dilutive effect under the VRA using a results test.77 In addition, the Gingles
preconditions have become a litmus test for jurisdictions drawing district lines to
determine whether they are in minimal compliance with the VRA since they set
forth the minimum information needed for results test VRA litigation.
The Gingles court did not specify whether the majority showing required in
the first precondition referred to total population (POP), voting age population
(VAP), or something else.78 Many early cases dealt with African American
populations, and many lower courts rested on voting age population as the correct
population of interest. That is, in order to satisfy the first Gingles precondition,
African American plaintiffs had to demonstrate their voting age population was
sufficiently large and compact to constitute a majority in a single member district.
However, in section 2 litigation brought by Latinos, some defendantjurisdictions argued that majority-minority districts were impossible or not
required because of the higher proportion of voting age Latinos who were not
citizens. Rather than simply prove a potential single member district with a
majority Latino POP or VAP to satisfy the first Gingles precondition, they argued
that Latino plaintiffs should have to clear an additional hurdle—that its citizen
voting age population (CVAP) was sufficient to constitute a majority of adult
citizens in a potential district.
To date, four U.S. courts of appeal have held that when citizenship rates
differ for minority and majority populations, plaintiffs must take citizenship into
account when trying to satisfy the first Gingles precondition. Due to the citizenship
profile of major racial/ethnic groups in the United States, the CVAP requirement
is likely to affect API populations.79
77. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits practices enacted with a discriminatory
purpose or intent as well as those that have a discriminatory result or disparate impact. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973. The Gingles preconditions guide analysis in disparate impact cases, where a court is asked to
determine whether an electoral scheme, such as at-large elections or districts, dilute minority voting
strength, making it more difficult for voters of color to elect a representative of their choice. See
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50.
78. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50. In addition, the Gingles Court did not specify whether the first
precondition had a numerical requirement. Did it mean a numerical majority, i.e., 50.01% or more?
Or something else? Id. Twenty-three years after Gingles, the U.S. Supreme Court confronted this
question in a case dealing with a district that was less than fifty percent black. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 6. In
Bartlett, a North Carolina county sued the state of North Carolina alleging that the state’s legislative
redistricting violated a provision of the state constitution that legislative districts should refrain from
splitting counties. Id. As a defense, the state argued that splitting counties was required to comply with
the VRA. Id. A group of three judges stated that a minority group must be at least fifty percent of a
district in order to satisfy the first Gingles precondition and trigger VRA protection. Id. at 19–20. This
has generally been accepted as a new standard that litigants and line-drawing jurisdictions must satisfy
when drawing electoral districts. See, e.g., Lowery v. Deal, 850 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1335 n.3 (S.D. Ga.
2012) (quoting Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 19–20); Comm. for a Fair and Balanced Map v. Ill. State Bd. of
Elections, 835 F. Supp. 2d 563, 581 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (quoting Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 19–20).
79. In addition, Latinos are likely to be affected. Most API and Latino populations have
higher rates of adult non-citizenship compared with non-Latino white, black, and Native American
populations. See infra Chart 1. Note, however, that this is not true of all API or Latino subgroups. For
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Ninth Circuit: The first circuit to confront this issue, the Ninth Circuit’s
1989 opinion in Romero v. City of Pomona80 set the stage for future cases. In this
challenge to the at-large method of electing the city council in the city of Pomona,
California, the Court approved defining the Latino population in terms of
citizenship, noting that Gingles “repeatedly makes reference to effective voting
majorities, rather than raw population totals, as the touchstone for determining
geographical compactness.”81
Eleventh Circuit: In 1997, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed
the issue in a section 2 challenge by Latino voters concerning the at-large election
of city commissioners in Miami Beach City, Florida.82 Plaintiffs presented
evidence that three majority Latino districts could be drawn. However, the court
found that when using citizenship data, rather than VAP or POP, the plaintiffs’
potential districts were not actually majority Latino and therefore did not satisfy
the first Gingles precondition.83
Fifth Circuit: Also in 1997, the Fifth Circuit ruled on “the relevance of
citizenship to a vote dilution claim” in a challenge to Houston’s city council
districting plan.84 The defendant city argued that, after taking disparate citizenship
rates85 into account, Latinos were actually overrepresented on the council.86 The
court agreed, finding that citizenship was a key consideration of section 2.87

example, a higher proportion of Japanese Americans are born in the United States and therefore a
higher proportion are citizens by birth compared to other Asian American population groups. See The
Rise of Asian Americans, PEW RESEARCH CENTER ( April 4, 2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/
2012/06/19/the-rise-of-asian-americans.
80. Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds by
Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 914 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1990). On appeal, plaintiff black and
Latino voters argued, among other things, that the district court erred by interpreting the first Gingles
precondition as requiring a geographically compact majority of eligible voters rather than raw
population, as the district court had found that after taking age and citizenship into account, neither
blacks nor Hispanics could constitute a majority in a single-member district. Id. at 1421, 1425. The
court also rejected a claim that black and Latino voters could be considered a single minority. See id. at
1420–21.
81. Romero, 883 F.2d at 1425. However, the court also notes that raw population figures were
relevant for establishing whether a minority population was high enough, citing with approval cases
that had required a total minority proportion of sixty-five percent or more to establish a voting
population majority. See id. at 1425 n.13.
82. Negrón v. City of Miami Beach, 113 F.3d 1563, 1565 (11th Cir. 1997).
83. Id. at 1568–69.
84. Campos v. City of Houston, 113 F.3d 544, 545, 547 (5th Cir. 1997).
85. The court noted that 1990 census data showed that 45.8% of voting age Latinos, 2.2% of
voting age non-Hispanic Anglos, and 1.6% of voting age non-Hispanic blacks were non-citizens and
ineligible to vote. Id. at 547.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 548 (“[ W ]e decline to reject citizenship as a relevant factor in the Gingles analysis.
The plain language of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act makes clear that its protections apply to
United States citizens.”) Because only citizens of voting age can vote, the court stated that “[i]t would
be a Pyrrhic victory for a court to create a single-member district in which a minority population
dominant in the absolute, but not in voting age [citizen] numbers, continued to be defeated at the
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Seventh Circuit: In 1998, the Seventh Circuit ruled on citizenship data in a
section 2 challenged to Chicago’s 1982 aldermanic districting plan.88 Although the
city’s plan appeared to underrepresent blacks and Latinos as a whole, the court
found that after taking citizenship data into account, the plan underrepresented
blacks by one district but overrepresented Latinos.89 Arguing that the VRA only
protects citizens,90 the court determined that such dilution is outside the purview
of the VRA.
Most line-drawing bodies and lawyers assume that they must use CVAP
numbers to determine VRA compliance, especially when dealing with API or
Latino communities. API voters seeking to dismantle electoral systems that dilute
their voting strength will have to work with CVAP data, which may pose
challenges, as described further below. In addition, it may make it harder to draw
majority–Asian American districts through redistricting processes. In the 2011
round of redistricting, many jurisdictions, including jurisdictions outside the four
circuits listed above, interpreted these cases as requiring that a majority-minority
district be drawn only when a minority population’s citizen voting age population
was greater than fifty percent.
II. PRACTICAL IMPACTS: CHALLENGES FOR API VOTERS
The CVAP and citizenship verification requirements discussed above are not
merely academic curiosities. They pose potentially serious ramifications on Asian
American political involvement and empowerment. Citizenship verification
policies may make it difficult for Asian Americans to register to vote, and may cast
doubt on Asian American voters who turn up on voter registration rolls and at the
polls. CVAP requirements may make it harder for Asian Americans to challenge
discriminatory electoral schemes and gain electoral representation. Since API
citizens already register and vote at lower rates than other population groups,91
polls.” Id. (quoting Brewer v. Ham, 876 F.2d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 1989)).
88. Barnett v. City of Chicago, 141 F.3d 699, 701 (7th Cir. 1998).
89. Id. at 705. In addition, the court engaged in a brief discussion of virtual representation
(the idea that ineligible voters’ (children, non-citizens, etc.) interests can be protected/executed via
voters), and found that such representational ideals were not within Congress’s mandate in the VRA.
Id. at 704–05. Indeed, it found that “[n]either the census nor any other policy or practice suggests that
Congress wants noncitizens to participate in the electoral system as fully as the concept of virtual
representation would allow.” Id. at 704.
90. Id. (“The right to vote is one of the badges of citizenship. The dignity and very concept of
citizenship are diluted if noncitizens are allowed to vote either directly or by the conferral of
additional voting power on citizens believed to have a community of interest with the noncitizens—
that being the very premise of the Latinos’ claim in this litigation.”).
91. See Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2008 – Detailed Table 1: Reported Voting &
Registration, by Sex and Single Years of Age: November 2008, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, available at http://
www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/2008/table02-1.xls (last visited Jan.
13, 2013) [hereinafter Voting and Registration 2008]; Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2010,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/
2010/Table1_2010.xls (last visited Jan. 13, 2013) [hereinafter Voting and Registration 2010].
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requirements that may chill or hinder political participation or prospects are even
more problematic.
A. Citizenship Verification: Hurdle to Registration and Voting?
As noted above, several states have adopted laws, constitutional provisions,
and administrative policies that aim to ferret out and remove non-citizens from
voting and registration. These actions do not impose a new citizenship
requirement, since U.S. citizenship was already required in order to register and
vote. Individuals seeking to register already had to swear under penalty of perjury
that they were citizens, and all states had provisions to challenge and remove
voters believed to be ineligible. Rather, these laws and policies constitute novel
additional measures put in place to police registration rolls and access to the ballot.
The laws and policies, as well as the arguments supporting them, suggest to the
public that non-citizen registration and voting is a real threat to the integrity of
U.S. elections.
Laws and policies requiring citizenship verification in order to register or
remain registered to vote are potentially harmful to API political engagement.
First, due to registration disparities, citizenship verification laws may impose a
greater burden on API citizens than others. Second, database and matching
inaccuracies may lead to erroneous identification of API voters as non-citizens.
Third, assumptions about foreignness may subject API voters to unwarranted
challenges in registration and/or at the polls.
1. Registration Disparities
As noted above, citizenship verification laws such as those in Arizona,
Georgia, Kansas, and Alabama apply only to new registrants and not existing
voters. Since API citizens are registered at lower rates than other groups, laws that
affect only new registrants will likely affect APIs at higher rates than other groups.
Chart 1 shows the percentage of voting age citizens for various racial groups who
reported being registered to vote in 2008 and 2010. API registration lags behind
that of non-Latino whites and African Americans. Since these laws exempt
currently registered individuals, fewer whites and African Americans will have to
produce proof of citizenship than APIs.
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Chart 1: Proportion of Citizens Reporting Voting and Registration by Race92
Additional verification requirements for new registrants can have effects on
political participation. First, since rates of participation are roughly equal between
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registered voters of different racial/ethnic groups, the registration gap is one of
the principal causes of the participation gap. Laws and policies that make it harder
to register to vote may help maintain the registration gap and therefore the
participation gap. In addition, laws that place additional hurdles on new voters
may dissuade them from entering the political process. The specter of having
one’s citizenship challenged can intimidate potential voters, especially newly
naturalized citizens or citizens with limited English proficiency.
2. Database Problems
The databases utilized raise serious concerns for API citizens seeking to
vote.93 Citizenship and naturalization data in state and even federal databases is

92. Voting and Registration 2008, supra note 91; Voting and Registration 2010, supra note 91.
93. In addition to inaccuracies in government databases, the process of cross-referencing and
matching datafiles can produce erroneous identifications. Voters may be erroneously matched with
another individual’s information in a driver’s license file, for example. The personal information often
used for matching, such as name and birthdate, is not as unique as one might think, so erroneous
matches are possible. See, e.g., Justin Levitt & Michael McDonald, Seeing Double Voting: An Extension of
the Birthday Problem, 7 ELECTION L.J. 111, 121 (2008).
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often outdated.94 Even if the matching is perfect, it is quite possible for someone
who appears as a non-citizen in one government database to in fact be a citizen.
Since databases often contain old information, they may not contain information
about naturalization. This was apparently the case for several challenged voters in
Florida and Colorado. These voters appeared as non-citizens in state and federal
databases, but were actually newly naturalized citizens and fully eligible to vote.95
Since more API adults are immigrants than other groups, they are more
likely to appear in a government database about immigrants or to appear in a
database with information indicating they are not citizens. For example, the
federal SAVE database contains information about immigrants, and not
information about native-born citizens. The same is true for state driver’s license
databases that collect citizenship information. It appears from news reports that
the New Mexico secretary of state used a separate database for individuals who
used an “alternate identification” as the source of her “foreign national” voters.96
3. Perceived “Foreignness”
When citizenship becomes a contested issue and fears about non-citizens
defrauding the electoral system abound, those perceived to be foreign are at higher
risk of being targeted for enforcement. Due to a confluence of factors beyond the
scope of this Article, concepts of who is “American” and who is “foreign” have
been racialized, leading to assumptions that non-Latino whites are “American”
while Asian Americans are “foreign.”97 The perceived foreignness of API
individuals often bares no relation to their actual citizenship status, leading to what
some call the “perpetual foreigner” status of Asian Americans.98 Particularly when
foreignness is racialized, suggesting that phenotype or appearance (as well as other
markers such as name, or accent) provide sufficient information to divine who is
and is not a citizen, laws and policies directed at citizenship are most likely to
affect individuals believed to be foreign.99 Citizenship verification for voter
registration has been justified by claims that non-citizens threaten election
integrity through illegal registration and voting. Although these laws appear to be

94. In addition, databases contain errors, such as those caused by errors in data input. Because
most voter registration forms are completed by hand and input into a database by hand, human error
is a real risk in voter files. See, e.g., COMM. ON STATE VOTER REGISTRATION DATABASES, NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, STATE VOTER REGISTRATION DATABASES: IMMEDIATE ACTIONS AND
FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS, INTERIM REPORT 41–44 (2008) (describing the various kinds of errors
that can occur in the voter registration process that lead to errors in voter registration files).
95. See Moreno, supra note 45.
96. See Simonich, supra note 54.
97. See, e.g., Saito, supra note 12; see also Claire Jean Kim, The Racial Triangulation of Asian
Americans, 27 POL. & SOC’Y 105 (1999). For a more general discussion of race and national identity,
see HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 11.
98. See, e.g., ANGELO N. ANCHETA, RACE, RIGHTS, AND THE ASIAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 62–65 (1998).
99. See id.
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neutral in that they target “non-citizens” and not any particular racial or national
origin group, those perceived to be foreign are most likely to be subject to
challenge.
Experiences in past election cycles bare out that citizenship-based challenges
are not uniformly and neutrally applied, but rather target individuals and groups
believed to be foreign. In the 1999 elections in Hamtramck, Michigan, poll
watchers selectively challenged certain voters on the basis of citizenship even
though they did not have individualized evidence to support these challenges.100
Poll watchers in the polls challenged voters who were Arab American, but did not
challenge white voters.101 Challenges were based on dark skinned Arab appearance
or having an Arab sounding name.102 Some challenged voters were made to take
oaths of citizenship even though they presented U.S. passports.103 Moreover, one
election official allegedly informed poll workers to require any voter who appeared
to be Arab to present an identification card or voter registration card.104 White
voters were not subject to challenges, were not made to take oaths of citizenship,
and were not targeted for additional identification.105
In the 2004 election cycle, one Georgia county registrar required voters with
Latino surnames to appear in court to prove their citizenship and eligibility to
vote.106 In 2005, an individual in Washington State challenged the citizenship
eligibility of several voters who had registered to vote when they got their driver’s
licenses, on the basis that they had names “that appear to be from outside the
United States.”107 In the run up to the 2012 elections, organizers rallying poll
watchers to challenge ineligible voters, including suspected non-citizens, justified
their efforts with reports that busloads of people “who [do] not appear to be from
this country”108 are brought in to vote. In these cases, names deemed to be
“foreign” were the sole basis for accusing individuals of being non-citizens and
illegally registered to vote.
In a context where citizenship is challenged based on appearance or name,
citizenship verification for voter registration laws may make it more difficult for
API citizens to register and vote. The “perpetual foreigner” stereotype—that

100. See Consent Decree, United States v. City of Hamtramck, No. 00-73541, available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_2/hamtramck_cd.pdf.
101. Id.
102. Id. ¶ 8.
103. Id. ¶ 10.
104. See id. ¶ 16.
105. Id.
106. Complaint at 2, United States v. Long County, (No. CV206-040) (S.D. Ga. 2006).
107. Jim Camden, Man Says Votes from Illegal Immigrants, THE SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (Spokane),
Mar. 31, 2005, at B1, available at http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2005/mar/31/man-says-votesfrom-illegal-immigrants.
108. Stephanie Saul, Looking, Very Closely, for Voter Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2012, at A1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/us/politics/groups-like-true-the-vote-are-looking
-very-closely-for-voter-fraud.html.
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Asian Americans are foreign regardless of their actual citizenship—places API
voters at higher risk for citizenship challenges. While proponents for citizenship
verification laws might argue that these are race-blind policies that will affect all
and counteract discrimination or stereotyping of certain groups, these laws also
institute an atmosphere of suspicion among poll workers and poll watchers, and
fear among voters. In the 1999 Hamtramck case discussed above, some Arab
American citizens who heard about the citizenship challenges at the polls were too
intimidated by the prospect of being challenged to go to the polls and attempt to
vote. Laws and policies that make it harder for Asian Americans to register and
vote pose an additional hurdle to Asian American civic engagement and
representation. This is of particular concern since API registration and voting is
already relatively low.
B. Citizenship Data and Districting
Citizenship data requirements may hinder API efforts to increase
representation and dismantle discriminatory districts and electoral schemes.
Requirements that API voters prove the possibility of a district that is over fifty
percent API CVAP and/or that redistricting officials can only draw a district to
help API empowerment if the API population is over fifty percent CVAP may
disadvantage API communities, largely because of problems with the data they
must use to make these determinations.
As noted above, the principle data questions in Gingles and most other cases
dealing with African Americans or Native Americans dealt with share of the total
population and/or voting age population. These figures are easily derived from
decennial census data.109 The census is an enumeration of the U.S. population
conducted every ten years.110 While serious questions about undercounts exist, the
census produces highly reliable data available at the smallest geographic units
(census blocks) often needed for district drawing.
The census asks about residency, birth date, gender, race, and Hispanic
ethnicity. Age data can be derived from the birth date question to determine
residents over age eighteen—voting age population. These data can be cross109. The census is an enumeration of the population to effectuate the requirements of Article
I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution. The census asks ten questions for each individual in a
household. The Questions on the Form, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/2010census/
text/text-form.php (last visited Jan. 13, 2013).
110. The census also provides the data used for reapportionment of U.S. House of
Representative seats among the states as well as in the distribution of federal funds to local
communities. Congressional Apportionment, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/prod/
cen2010/briefs/c2010br-08.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2013). The data used for redistricting are
“apportionment data,” which differ from “resident data” also released from the census.
Apportionment data include the resident population as well as U.S. residents and U.S. military and
civilian government workers living abroad at the time of the census, less the population of the District
of Columbia. Questions and Answers - 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/2010
census/about/answers.php (last visited Jan. 13, 2013).
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referenced with the race or Hispanic question to derive VAP figures for each
racial/ethnic group. These data allow line drawers, interested parties, litigators,
courts, and others to draw districts that contain equal populations and to
determine if and where the Voting Rights Act may require majority-minority
districts to avoid diluting minority voting strength.111 However, the census does
not ask about citizenship.
The principle source of data for citizenship is a sample-based survey
administered by the Census Bureau—the American Community Survey (ACS).
The ACS asks many more social and economic questions than the decennial
census, one of which pertains to citizenship. Cross-referencing age and citizenship
data produce CVAP figures. Further cross-referencing with race/Hispanic data
produces CVAP figures for various racial/ethnic groups.
While the ACS is an excellent source of data for many uses, it is not an
optimal data source for district drawing and VRA enforcement.112 Unlike the
census, the ACS does not provide “counts” of the population; it provides
estimates of the population.113 Because of sample size issues, ACS data are not
available on the smallest geographical units used in redistricting. While the ACS is
designed to provide reliable estimates using one year of data for areas with
populations over sixty-five thousand, which includes all states and many counties,
multiple years of data must be aggregated in order to obtain data for smaller
areas.114 However, even aggregating five years of answers, the data are still not
available at the census block level. This is problematic because district drawing
often requires precise population calculations which can even go down to the
census block level.

111. In the redistricting context, these data are often referred to as “PL data” or “PL 94-171
data” in reference to the federal law that requires the Census Bureau to provide them to the states for
use in redistricting. This law also requires that tabulations of redistricting data be provided to the
states within one year of the collection of the census. Act of Dec. 23, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-171, 89
Stat. 1023.
112. For a more in depth discussion of issues with the ACS and redistricting, see generally
JORGE CHAPA ET AL., THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON LAW AND SOC. POLICY,
REDISTRICTING: ESTIMATING CITIZEN VOTING AGE POPULATION (2011), available at http://www
.law.berkeley.edu/files/Redistricting_PolicyBrief4_forWeb.pdf.
113. The ACS report estimates in the form of point estimates and margins of error, making
the estimates area actually a range of values. Id. at 9.
114. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, A COMPASS FOR UNDERSTANDING AND USING
AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY DATA: WHAT RESEARCHERS NEED TO KNOW 3 (2009), available
at http://www.census.gov/acs/www/Downloads/handbooks/ACSResearch.pdf. Three years of data
are aggregated to produce estimates for places with populations greater than 20,000, and five years of
data are aggregated to produce estimates for all units of geography down to the census block group
level. Id. Five-year aggregated data are the only source available as close to the small levels of
geography needed for drawing electoral districts. Id. at 7. However, where the population in a block
group or other area is very small, the Census Bureau suppresses and does not release an estimate in
order to protect individual respondents’ privacy. Id. at 8. For the 2011 round of redistricting, CVAP
estimates came from the first release of five-year aggregated; this dataset included responses from
surveys administered between 2005 and 2009. Id. at app.2, tbl.2.

2013]

ASIAN AMERICAN POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT

1101

More importantly for Asian American voters, the aggregation process may
lead to data estimates that underestimate Asian American CVAP. Since five years
of answers are combined, some of the data will be old. This is of particular
concern for Asian Americans because it may lead to an underestimate of their
citizen voting age populations. When the Census Bureau aggregates answers
collected over five years, it does not “correct” the data for intervening changes,
even for aging. Accordingly, an Asian American citizen who was thirteen years old
at the beginning of the aggregation period still appears as a minor despite the
passage of time. Since she is not included as being eighteen in the aggregated
dataset, she does not count as an Asian American voting age citizen but rather as a
minor despite her actual age of majority status. This is true for minor citizens of all
groups, but is a key issue for Asian Americans, because the citizenship rate among
minor APIs is significantly higher than that of adult APIs. A similar disparity does
not exist between black, white, or Native American youths and adults.
Accordingly, the coming of age of API minors will increase the citizenship
rate of adult APIs as well as the proportion of adult citizens who are API. Chart 2
shows the estimated citizenship rate among minors and adults for various groups
in the Special Tabulation derived from the 2005–2009 aggregated ACS data.
Because of the significant disparity in citizenship rates between Asian American
minors and adults demonstrated in Chart 2, the aggregated data’s failure to “age
up” minor API citizens can have profound and disparate results on their reported
proportion of a given area, since there is not a corresponding disparity in
citizenship rates between minor and adult non-Latino whites (or blacks or Native
Americans). Especially when forced to comply with a fifty percent CVAP bright
line requirement, this quirk in the ACS data can disenfranchise API voters since
although their CVAP may actually be over fifty percent, the data do not yet reflect
it.
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Chart 2: Comparison of Citizenship Rates Among Minors and Adults by Race115
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Some have opined that the CVAP issue is not likely to have a significant
effect on the voting rights of people of color.116 While it is true that the fifty
percent threshold may not pose a significant obstacle to groups with large and
highly concentrated populations or for groups with similar citizenship profiles to
non-Latino whites, in some areas and for some groups, the fifty percent CVAP
requirements coupled with ACS data issues may affect access to VRA protection.
Asian Americans may fall short of VRA protection thresholds not because their
citizen voting age population numbers are too low, but because they are unable to
prove they reach at least fifty percent of a potential district given current data
availability. This is particularly true for APIs in many areas of the country because
their populations are relatively small. A small underestimate could make the
difference in a successful VRA claim or a line-drawing body drawing districts that
allow API voters to elect a representative of their choice.

115. Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) Special Tabulation from the 2005–2009 5-Year
American Community Survey, U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/rdo/data/voting_age
_population_by_citizenship_and_race_cvap.html (last visited Dec. 31, 2013).
116. See, e.g., Nathaniel Persily, The Law of the Census: How to Count, What to Count, Whom to
Count and Where to Count Them, 32 CARDOZO L. REV.755, 765 (2011).
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Existing case law contains examples where CVAP data made a difference in
VRA protection. For example, in the Miami Beach litigation discussed above,
Latino plaintiffs were able to draw three of seven districts over fifty percent
Latino VAP, but applying citizenship data made it impossible to draw a district
over fifty percent Latino.117 Moreover, in a 2009 Texas lawsuit, the court rejected
plaintiff’s claim, even though plaintiff provided a potential districting plan that
included a district that was seventy-eight percent Latino population and seventyfive percent Latino VAP, because it did not “prove” over fifty percent Latino
CVAP.118
The fifty percent bright line rule and CVAP requirements can also effect
redistricting decisions. When a jurisdiction believes that only districts over fifty
percent minority CVAP are required by the Voting Rights Act, it may decide that
districts with high, but not over fifty percent minority, CVAP should not be
drawn. This could be because they choose to prioritize other redistricting
criteria,119 and do not feel bound to draw a less than fifty percent district; because
they fear a plan will be invalidated as unconstitutional if they draw a high minority
district that is not required;120 or because it wants to draw as few minority districts
as possible, so will only draw those that are blatantly required by the case law.
Regardless of the motive, the result is the same if line-drawing officials fail to
draw a high minority district simply because it falls short of the fifty percent
CVAP threshold. When CVAP data underestimate actual Asian American citizen
voting age populations, the fifty percent bright line rule may have a
disenfranchising effect. For example, in California’s 2011 state redistricting, the
Citizen’s Redistricting Commission (CRC) drew a majority-API state assembly
district. California’s AD 49, in the San Gabriel Valley, has an Asian American
CVAP of 50.09%.121 To achieve this, the CRC divided a few cities between AD 49
and other adjacent districts.122 The California Constitution advises against splitting
cities if possible, but prioritizes VRA compliance over avoiding city splits. If it had
not been possible to draw AD 49 with over fifty percent Asian CVAP, VRA
coverage might not be triggered, leaving the CRC to weigh other redistricting

117. Negrón v. City of Miami Beach, 113 F.3d 1563, 1567 (11th Cir. 1997).
118. Reyes v. City of Farmers Branch, 586 F.3d 1019, 1021–22 (5th Cir. 2009).
119. Other redistricting criteria may include incumbent protection, maintaining municipal or
county boundaries, following natural landmarks, achieving compact districts, etc. See, e.g., CAL.
CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d) (2010) (setting forth the criteria to be used to draw state legislative and U.S.
House of Representative districts in California).
120. The Supreme Court has prohibited the use of race as the sole or predominant factor in
districting decisions. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993).
121. See CALIFORNIA CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N, FINAL REPORT ON 2011
REDISTRICTING app.3, tbl.4 (2011) available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/meeting
_handouts_082011/crc_20110815_5appendix_3.pdf . Note that the Asian VAP in AD 49 is 55.04%.
See id. tbl.3.
122. See id. app.4, available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/meeting_handouts
_082011/crc_20110815_6appendix_4.pdf.
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criteria, such as avoiding city splits. An underestimate of just a small number of
Asian American voting age citizens can make a real difference in this kind of
situation.
CONCLUSION
Citizenship and voting have a special relationship in the United States. In
recent years, efforts have accelerated to ensure that voting and electoral
representation is indeed limited to citizens only. Citizenship verification laws and
policies affect who can gain access to and remain on voter rolls, which in turn
determines who may cast a ballot and have a voice in our democracy. Citizenship
data requirements limit district drawing efforts as well as Voting Rights Act
challenges to electoral schemes due to weaknesses in the data that Asian
Americans are forced to use.
While on their face these measures make sense since voting is limited to
citizens in nearly all U.S. jurisdictions, they have additional consequences that
more harshly affect API citizens. Citizenship verification laws impose a new
hurdle to voter registration, which disproportionately affect APIs, due to their
lower voter registration rates, higher immigration rates (particularly among adults),
and stereotype of perpetual foreignness. Citizenship data requirements make
drawing districts that empower API communities as well as dismantling electoral
systems that dilute API voting strength more difficult. Both citizenship
verification and data requirements have the potential to impede API political
participation and empowerment. This is particularly worrisome given API’s
already generally low levels of voter registration and participation.
Beyond the practical questions about potential effect on Asian American
disenfranchisement, these measures pose larger questions about membership in
U.S. society—who is a member and how can members be distinguished from nonmembers in contemporary settings? Both policy decisions seek to limit voting and
representation to citizens by excluding non-citizens, raising larger questions about
who is a citizen and therefore worthy of representational participation. In the
process of defining who members are not, the U.S. polis defines itself. In a nation
undergoing demographic shifts with cultural and racial/ethnic overtones but
where racially discriminatory means of identification are no longer acceptable,
defining who is a member becomes simultaneously more logistically difficult and
important to majority members.
It remains to be seen whether the burgeoning preoccupation with citizenship
in voting is a function of politics in a presidential election year or a more durable
fixture of our political system in an era of demographic change. In the meantime,
Asian American political empowerment may be hindered by citizenship
preoccupations, adding novel challenges that must be overcome to achieve full
political membership.

